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FOREWORD: HEALTH POLICY’S 
FOURTH DIMENSION 
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST* AND BARAK D. RICHMAN** 
Health policy analysts in the United States have traditionally divided their 
subject under three headings: access, cost, and quality.  This symposium 
suggests that these analysts have culpably neglected a fourth, arguably coequal 
issue: namely, equity in the distribution of system costs and benefits among the 
purchasing, tax-paying population.  Although reasonable minds can differ over 
many issues of health policy, no one can reasonably argue that the system’s 
costs should be borne disproportionately by those with less ability to pay.  Nor 
is it easy to argue against giving individuals and families wanting health 
coverage the option—within limits—of spending only what they feel they can 
(with available subsidies) afford, prepaying only for the quantity and quality of 
health services they deem appropriate for their circumstances.  The lead article 
in this symposium, written by the undersigned Special Editors,1 identifies a 
number of issues related to the symposium’s overall theme of distributive 
justice.  In general, we develop the hypothesis that the U.S. health care system 
operates more like a robber baron than like the Robin Hood it is reputed to be, 
taking excessive amounts from ordinary payers of health insurance premiums 
and enriching, directly or indirectly, the health care industry and its higher-
income customers, both as consumers and as taxpayers.  A principal objective 
has been to show how the linked questions in the symposium’s title—who pays 
and who benefits—deserve equal billing with the three usual suspects. 
The overall goal of the symposium is to stimulate wider awareness and 
discussion of some serious fairness issues in the way the U.S. health care system 
treats those who foot its enormous bills.  The lead article emphasizes, first, that 
Americans with health coverage pay not only for their own families’ health care 
but also to support a vast health care enterprise that primarily benefits others, 
many of whom are more, not less, affluent than themselves.  The system is able 
to finance itself in part because U.S.-style health insurance greatly amplifies 
price-gouging opportunities for health care firms with monopoly power, 
creating a cost burden that falls ultimately on all premium payers equally, like a 
severely regressive “head tax.”  The article identifies a variety of equity issues 
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associated with relying on nonprofit institutions with market power and tax-
exempt status to fund a range of health care activities, not all of which would be 
found deserving of direct public subsidies if submitted to the usual processes for 
setting public spending priorities.  In addition, we suggest that ordinary 
premium payers may also bear an unfair share of the cost of inducing 
technological innovation in the health sector. 
The second main theme of the lead article is that working-class insured 
consumers, in addition to paying a disproportionate share of the cost of 
producing various public goods, also bear excessive costs for their own health 
care.  Here the problem is not only that many unit prices are supra-competitive.  
Our more important claim is that the coverage that consumers must buy if they 
are to have any coverage at all necessarily includes an entitlement to many 
costly services that have only modest marginal value, especially when compared 
to other uses the consumer might have for the extra money he is forced to 
spend.  The article gives many reasons why lower- and middle-income 
consumers buy coverage that seems suitable only for the affluent.  The most 
obvious explanation is the absence in the marketplace of significantly lower-
cost insurance options.  Here the problem is partly overregulation, including the 
professionally dictated standards of medical care that are both incorporated by 
reference in insurance coverage and enforced in malpractice litigation.  An 
insurer offering access to only basic care (rather than to everything that the 
health and legal systems deem “medically necessary”) would face not only 
daunting legal barriers and risks but also a difficult marketing task and 
competition from the so-called safety net, which protects uninsured consumers 
against at least some risks at no up-front cost; moreover, an insurer probably 
could not recover its investments in meeting these large challenges because its 
competitors could quickly imitate its success.  Paradoxically, of course, it is 
consumers themselves who have long demanded high-quality, costly coverage 
and resisted efforts to economize.  Our explanation for their seemingly perverse 
preferences is that, because of the tax subsidy for employer-sponsored health 
coverage, consumers do not see with any clarity the very heavy costs that their 
own high expectations cause them to bear.  Our article emphasizes not only the 
market, but also the political, effects of a tax system that induces consumers to 
believe that the cost of their health coverage falls mostly on their employers, 
not themselves. 
Our article also provocatively suggests some reasons for believing, even in 
the absence of definitive empirical evidence, that lower-income insureds get 
significantly less out of their employers’ health plans than their higher-income 
coworkers, despite paying the same premiums.  The net direction of wealth 
transfers here is difficult to determine in part because lower-income persons 
tend to have poorer health and thus greater need for certain health services.  
Yet, we suspect that intra-plan subsidies are regressive on balance because 
higher-income insureds tend to make greater use of their entitlements. 
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The eleven other articles in this symposium are in varying degrees 
comments on and elaborations or criticisms of specific observations or 
arguments in the lead article.  Readers should find these articles and comments 
valuable in exposing both strengths and shortcomings in our work, in expanding 
our insights, and in putting issues we raise in larger contexts.  The task of 
exploring health policy’s “fourth dimension” has only just begun, however.  The 
following paragraphs describe areas in which there is a need for deeper 
exploration of distributive justice issues than this symposium is able to provide. 
The Tax Subsidy.  This subsidy has been a much-criticized feature of the 
U.S. health policy landscape for so long, yet has seemed so immune to political 
reform, that it seldom receives the rigorous scrutiny it deserves.  For example, 
the principal problem is not the regressivity of the subsidy itself (indeed, the 
lead article questions whether its net effect has been regressive at all) but its 
distorting effect on choices by employers, employees, union leaders, insurers 
and health plans, consumer advocates, voters, public officials, and legislatures.  
It is no coincidence in a political world that the true costs of coverage are kept 
largely hidden from those who pay them and that regulatory and other policies 
consistently enshrine the values and advance the interests of the health care 
industry and other elites.  To be sure, consumers like to think of health care, not 
as a consumer good featuring tradeoffs between benefits and costs, but as a 
technocratically determined entitlement provided to them mostly at someone 
else’s expense.  In fact, however, most of them are paying good money for 
health care and would be better off if they took more control or exercised more 
influence over the many spending decisions that others make on their behalf.  
Although articles herein by Mark Pauly2 and Lawrence Zelenak3 helpfully put 
the tax subsidy in economic and tax-policy contexts, further research is needed 
to verify and quantify the resulting inequities and to test our hypothesis that the 
subsidy’s most worrisome effects are essentially political. 
Health Care Law and Regulation.  Legal scholars and other analysts should 
ponder our claim that, in health care perhaps more than any other sector, the 
true interests of consumer-voters are ill-served by the political, regulatory, and 
legal environment.  Christopher Conover’s article4 herein reports some early, 
admittedly imprecise estimates of the costs of health-sector regulation.  Tom 
Miller’s article5 argues that excessive regulation of the health care market might 
induce individuals to seek inputs that neither efficiently nor effectively lead to 
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better health outcomes, and Lesley Curtis and Kevin Schulman6 explain how 
regulation may block competitive offerings that, even if facially inferior to 
currently available goods and services, would in fact enhance the welfare of 
many consumers.  The political economy of health care remains poorly 
understood, yet is the root cause of many of the health system’s failings with 
respect to access, cost, quality, and distributive justice. 
The Law of Medical Malpractice.  Unlike most literature on medical 
malpractice reform, the lead article treats the tort system as an essential part of 
the regulatory regime, yet another driver of costs that ordinary premium payers 
should not be forced to pay.  It also emphasizes the regressive consequences of 
treating lost income as a principal component of tort damages, suggesting—
contrary to the current trend in tort reform—that caps should be placed on 
certain economic damages, not noneconomic ones.  The symposium’s only 
contribution to the limited literature on distributional consequences of the tort 
system is Chen-Sen Wu’s thoughtful article on pharmaceutical torts. 7 
The Uninsured.  A key argument in the lead article is that giving people 
opportunities to economize would both enable more people to insure 
themselves and make it easier (that is, cheaper) for government to help 
everyone procure coverage—by, say, offering a refundable tax credit of a 
certain amount.  There has been relatively little research on how the market 
might be enabled and encouraged to make radically lower-cost coverage 
available to ordinary Americans.  Yet nothing would be more constructive than 
successful public or private efforts to define more limited, affordable 
entitlements and to confer legitimacy on the resulting limitations on access to 
arguably beneficial services by ensuring that they reflect reasonably informed, 
appropriately subsidized consumer choices. 
The Interaction of Health Insurance and Monopoly.  One of the more 
important insights in our lead article is our hypothesis that health insurance, 
while curbing monopoly’s usual misallocative effects, exacerbates the price-
increasing, redistributive effects of health-sector monopolies.  Economists need 
to verify the soundness of this insight and to estimate whether monopoly 
overcharges are in fact a serious problem in markets where insurers seem well 
positioned to keep prices competitive.  Assuming they validate our hypothesis 
that monopoly is a problem, economists might estimate, and suggest ways to 
minimize, the distortions that supra-monopoly profits earned by hospital, 
patent, and other health care monopolists cause in the larger economy. 
Tax-exempt Firms.  The lead article argues that the monopoly problem is no 
less great in the health care sector because many monopoly profits are plowed 
back into more and better services and products.  Indeed, we say some rather 
scathing things about nonprofit monopolies, the “head tax” they impose on 
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working Americans, and their potential for seriously misallocating resources.  
The article by Richard Schmalbeck8 provides helpful background on tax 
exemptions in the health sector, and an article by one of us9 explores the 
implications of our hypothesis for antitrust policy toward hospital mergers.  
There is much more here for economists and other scholars to study than just 
differences in the way nonprofit and for-profit firms behave. 
R&D in Health Care.  Without disputing that R&D yields large social 
surpluses and is generally undersupplied in free markets, the lead article offers 
the especially challenging hypothesis that U.S. premium payers are bearing too 
much of the cost of inducing innovation in health care.  In addition, we suggest 
that, because U.S. health plans lack—de facto and to some extent de jure—the 
power to resist the price demands of true monopolists, they may over-reward 
them, possibly inducing misplaced investment in health care R&D.  Our 
concerns about fairness add an important new dimension to the already 
complex problem of getting innovation incentives right in the health sector. 
Income-related Inequities in Health Plans.  The lead article hypothesizes, 
with only suggestive supporting evidence, that disparities exist in the 
distribution of benefits within individual health plans, whose subscribers pay 
essentially equal premiums but may not receive actuarially equivalent value in 
return.  Mark Hall’s article10 expands helpfully on our speculations, but we are 
struck by the paucity of studies focusing on disparities of this particular kind. 
Macroeconomic Effects.  Although the health care sector is often admired 
for being largely recession-proof, its special lock on the economy’s resources is 
a function of people’s difficulty in economizing on health care when family 
budgets are squeezed.  The difficulties faced by working Americans in tough 
times may also include, moreover, lessened job security because the health 
sector’s one-sixth of the economy is relatively immune to recessionary 
pressures.  Again, we have not seen (or found) research on such questions, 
which relate directly to our larger concern about distributional equity. 
Health Savings Accounts.  Though widely advocated as a way to re-empower 
consumers in purchasing health care, health savings accounts (HSAs) make 
more policy sense as a new tax-favored way to purchase health care and thus as 
at least a second-best strategy for reducing some of the market distortions 
caused by the tax subsidy.  Unfortunately, the direct benefits of HSAs currently 
accrue chiefly to high-bracket taxpayers while doing relatively little to make 
health coverage any more efficient or affordable by the rank and file.11 
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Medicare.  Although the articles in this symposium focus almost exclusively 
on the special burdens borne by lower- and middle-income payers of private 
health insurance premiums, public programs, too, are less progressive than is 
generally believed.  Although the Medicaid program is generally progressive in 
its impact, there is real uncertainty about the net distributional effects of 
Medicare—notwithstanding its iconic status among progressives.12  In any event, 
any past inequities are trivial in comparison with those that could be expected if 
the federal government attempts to meet the program’s vast unfunded liabilities 
by increasing payroll taxes on a shrinking number of working Americans.  The 
lead article’s endorsement of efforts to find ways of defining significantly 
limited entitlements may point the only feasible way to making Medicare’s 
future manageable. 
*          *          * 
Neither ethicists nor policy analysts have focused appreciable attention, 
beyond concern for the poor and uninsured, on distributive justice issues in 
American health care.  Yet such issues are central in any effort to address 
problems of access, cost, and quality.  Moreover, they are cumulatively very 
significant.  Thus, our article herein suggests that as much as half a trillion 
dollars per year in inappropriate spending in the United States comes mostly 
from the pockets of middle-class premium payers.  Notably, these are the same 
Americans whose real incomes have been growing for some time, if at all, more 
slowly than incomes of the affluent. 
Articles herein by Jonathan Oberlander13 and David Hyman,14 representing 
different ends of the political spectrum, comment provocatively on how our 
concerns about distributive justice relate to prospects for major health reform.  
Even though our article only hints at, rather than prescribing, specific policies 
for the future, these commentators agree that the path to reform of any kind 
will be difficult.  They also agree, as others undoubtedly must, that the 
unfairnesses identified and discussed in this symposium add significantly to the 
urgency of reforming American health care. 
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